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INTRODUCTION 
i: A Research Puzzle and Argument 
The power balance between France and Germany in the European Union has been 
one of great discussion and debate. Countless journalists have argued that Germany’s 
power has risen gradually against the seemingly perpetually stronger France over the past 
60 years, and is now finally set to surpass France; but how true are these claims? How 
can power within the EU truly be measured? It is a combination of political and social 
factors, but overwhelmingly, economic factors, in which Germany has consistently 
excelled. 
My main argument is that the power balance between France and Germany has 
remained relatively stable since the beginning of unionization negotiations. I argue that 
the notion that Germany’s power in the European Union has recently surpassed that of 
France is false. Journals such as The Economist and The Wall Street Journal have 
claimed that France and Germany have become too dissimilar to maintain the strong 
relationship they once held, emphasized mostly by their economic differences, which has 
led to a breakdown of the Franco-German relationship. The Economist calls the Franco-
German axis a “myth of an equal partnership,” but history and EU budget analysis say 
otherwise. As I will show in my paper, Germany has continually been the largest source 
of economic power in the European Union, and has perpetually been the stronger 
economic and political power in the Franco-German relationship. This clarification is 
important to understand because it emphasizes the continuing importance of Germany in 
the Franco-German relationship, as well as the implications for an economically strong 
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Germany in the European Union. Germany’s economic influence coupled with France’s 
political influence has made for an important and effective leadership in the EU where 
cooperation and competition provide the most encompassing results of European policy-
making. 
My paper consists of three main chapters. The first chapter entitled, “Germany’s 
Relative Bargaining Power,” will explore German power relative to French power 
throughout the course of unionization discussions, through the creation of the European 
Monetary Union, the Stability and Growth Pact, and the creation of the shared currency. 
My second chapter, “The Discourse on the Franco-German Relationship,” will examine 
the contemporary discourse on the Franco-German power balance and relationship in 
scholarly magazines, articles, newspapers, as well as in interviews with European 
bureaucrats. This chapter focuses on opinions regarding Germany’s changing political 
behavior, France and Germany in the aftermath of the economic crisis, and Germany’s 
diverging interests. My third chapter, “Demonstrating Germany’s Relative Power through 
an Examination of the EU Budget” will look at the changing composition of contributors 
and recipients of EU Budget funds since the creation of the euro, with special emphasis 
on German and French contributions, and end with an analysis of the bail-outs and 
financial redistributions since the European debt crisis. 
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ii: A Background of the Franco-German Relationship 
The Franco-German relationship has served as the anchor of European integration 
since the creation of the European Union in 1958.1 In the past fifty years, France and 
Germany have built a strong partnership based on association, mutual goals, and 
friendship, but this did not come before a prolonged period of struggle. The 1963 post-
war Franco-German Treaty of Cooperation concluded formally the long-standing conflict 
between France and Germany, which included twenty-three wars. Also known as the 
Treaty of Friendship, it set an official seal on reconciliation and continuing cooperation 
between France and Germany, calling for consultations between the two countries on all 
important questions and efforts, and implementing regular summits.2 Despite this formal 
pact of cooperation, uncertainty arrived following German integration, as both countries 
were forced to adjust to a different power balance caused by the unification of Germany 
as well as the Soviet Union’s collapse. Before German reunification, when Germany was 
divided and weak and France was fully involved in the political and economic western 
world, France was very much the dominant political partner of the two. After 1990 
however, Germany regained much of its power and sovereignty, essentially catching up 
to France, and transforming into a power to be reckoned with, strategically advantaged 
being in the center of Europe.  
                                                          
1
 The European Union was originally created as the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951, which 
later led to the European Economic Community (1958). It officially developed its name as the European 
Union in 1993. Maclean, Mairi, and Jean-Marc Trouille. France, Germany, and Britain: Partners in a 
Changing World. Houndmills, Basingstoke: New York, 2001. Print. 
2
 Brueggemann, Aminia M. Rhine Crossings France and Germany in Love and War. Albany: State Univ. 
of New York, 2005. Print. 
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One of the main differences that France and Germany needed to reconcile was 
their differing governing strategies within the European Union. France and Germany had 
different structures and institutions which made cooperation difficult. France was a 
centralized state, similar to the likes of the UK and Spain, while Germany was not, which 
made administrative issues challenging.3 Germany preferred to launch joint initiatives, 
which took particular importance leading up to the Intergovernmental Conferences. The 
success of joint cooperation on initiatives and policy leading up to the IGCs attests to the 
strength of the bond and desire for progress between Germany and France. The shared 
will to cooperate and create results between the two countries showed that political will 
was an essential factor in giving momentum to European Monetary Union policy, which 
triumphed over separate policy interests. Negotiations created a shared commitment to 
reach success void of blame or argument so that the EMU would emerge successfully 
along a smooth path of dialogue and compromise. Throughout all levels of cooperation, 
France and Germany remained cognizant of the domestic situation and needs of the other 
country. 
The creation of the EMU permanently altered the parameters of the Franco-
German relationship, establishing France and Germany in the center of EU cooperation 
amongst the other member states. Though the relationship between the two states was 
still tenuous, it was strengthened by a newfound confidence founded in economic and 
monetary cooperation. Despite the fact that the First and Second World Wars had been 
based upon French and German antagonism, this past antagonism matched the drive with 
                                                          
3
 Mazzucelli, Colette. France and Germany at Maastricht: Politics and Negotiations to Create the 
European Union. New York: Garland Publ., 1997. Print. 
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which the Franco-German motor progressed through European unification. This 
adjustment of the Franco-German relationship set the tone for the formation of the 
European Union. It proved that if France and Germany were able to put aside their 
differences for mutual political and economic progress, their fellow member states could 
achieve the same goal with even less effort. The collaboration, in effect was more 
important to the creation of the EMU rather than the actual functioning of the EMU, as it 
set the tone for the rest of its passage. The eurozone’s economic nature made cooperation 
even more vital as it forced economic alliance before social association. Europe’s 
unification on the basis of Franco-German reconciliation on an economic foundation 
reinforced France and Germany’s political bond in addition to its bond throughout social 
and defense policies. 
The power of the Franco-German relationship was one that was unparalleled to 
any previous European partnership. The relationship’s power was derived primarily from 
its economic capacity. In 1996, together France and Germany accounted for 56.48% of 
the eurozone’s GDP, 57.5% of fixed capital formation, 57.7% of private consumption, 
and 45.7% of exports.4 Their weight was also accounted for by the role of their currencies 
through bonds, notes, and market instruments. 59% of total bonds issued in 1996 were 
held by France and Germany, who provided 53.7% of the EU monetary base circulation. 
They also held a shareholding of 49.2% to the central bank, and contributed 39.5% to its 
reserves.5 France and Germany roughly owned or dictated 50% of the European Union, 
which reinforced the notion that the two countries were the “core” or the “axis” of the 
                                                          
4
 See Note 1: Maclean & Trouille 
5
 See Note 1: Maclean & Trouille 
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European Union. It also reinforced the sense of duty that it was the joint responsibility of 
France and Germany to bring stability and growth to the euro and to the eurozone. The 
eurozone acted as a motor for accelerating Franco-German cooperation upon its 
foundation in the Elysée contact in economic policy, most notably in economic policy 
through financial reforms within the Union in terms of exchange rate policies, 
employment and growth policies. Financial reforms urged cooperation over dissent, 
strengthening the Franco-German relationship slowly but consistently through the years, 
and creating a new institutional context outside of the political direction of its national 
parties. At the same time, loyalty between France and Germany continued to grow, as it 
proved to be the strongest strategy to ensuring joint political success, despite possible 
costs to social democratic ideology. 
The economic and political collaboration between France and Germany in 
addition to their sheer comparative economic power over the rest of the EU member 
states ensured them a position of leadership in the Union. Moreover, other EU member 
states were pleased to see the positive result of Franco-German cooperation as 
confirmation that they too could converge their views in order to progress politically as a 
union. France and Germany were seen as the main bodies with the necessity to converge, 
especially in terms of the differing economist and monetarist approaches to the monetary 
union6, and differing views concerning economic government and central bank 
independence (which have continued into today).  
                                                          
6
 The economist and monetarist debates considered of a difference in opinion wherein monetarists believed 
that the fixing of exchange rates and the adoption of a common currency would ensure sufficient 
convergence of the economies wanting to join the Union. Economists, on the other hand, believed that the 
adoption of a single currency should be the end of a lengthy process of convergence for those countries 
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Despite their challenging joint history with over twenty conflicts, France and 
Germany have become natural allies in building the European Union, creating the closest 
and strongest relationship in existence between any two nations. Facing a large number of 
differences and obstacles, the convergence between France and Germany since the early 
1950s through differing economic philosophies, policies and practices has sustained. This 
joint leadership has led to a most critical relationship where France and Germany’s 
separate strengths and weaknesses have elevated the relationship to a level matching the 
greatest strengths of each country. Germany’s economic vigor combined with France’s 
social emphasis has led to the creation of a Europe representative of the desires and 
emphases of all of its citizens.  
iii: The Current Relationship 
“Caught in an intense relationship between love and hate, France and Germany have 
engaged in a dialectic marked both by aggression and mistrust, on the one hand, and a 
mutual fascination and respect on the other.”7 
Today, France and Germany are not just partners in European integration, but also 
competitors on political and economic terms.8 Not only are France and Germany the two 
largest member states, but their relative power position has increased because they 
represented the two prevalent different views in the EU on economic and monetary 
                                                                                                                                                                             
wanting to join the Union, and believed that the rigorous conditions possible should be set for the creation 
of a common currency. (Eg. Maastricht criteria and Stability & Growth Pact) 
7
 See Note 2: Bruggemann 
8
 See Note Maclean & Trouille 
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union.9 Germany and France dominate the negotiations and determine the crucial features 
of policy outcomes among themselves to the extent that the Franco-German exchange can 
be seen as a subset of the multiparty negotiations among the other states.10 By reducing 
the number of players in the negotiations to just two, Franco-German negotiations 
decrease transaction costs, which in turn increase the probability of compromise.11 From 
an intergovernamentalist point of view, the member states arrange themselves in two 
factions, siding with either Germany or France to build coalitions.12 This synergy 
between France and Germany coupled with the shared desire to seek compromise is one 
which, despite times of conflict, always manages to yield desirable results. Today, the 
relationship between Germany and France is one of both cooperation and competition.  
The two countries have altered their production focuses over the years: in 1945, France 
was dominated by agriculture, but in recent years France has become the leading supplier 
of advanced technologies in air, space and energy, partnering often with Germany to 
create great technological progress (though merger issues regarding control of new 
ventures and the role of the state remain sensitive).13 Through this important symmetry, 
neither country depicts its neighbor as an enemy, but as a neighbor with a shared desire to 
increase growth and productivity. 
  
                                                          
9
 Heipertz, Martin, and Amy C. Verdun. Ruling Europe the Politics of the Stability and Growth Pact. 
Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2010. Print. 
10
 See Note 9: Heipertz & Verdun 
11
 See Note 9: Heipertz & Verdun 
12
 See Note 9: Heipertz & Verdun 
13
 See Note 2: Bruggemann 
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CHAPTER 1: GERMANY’S RELATIVE BARGAINING POWER 
Recent literature has shown that journalists believe Germany to be on the road to 
overtaking France in terms of relative power in the leadership of the EU, but is this a 
valid claim? In this section, I will present examples of Germany’s consistent economic 
strength relative to France in order to showcase that Germany has been a stronger power 
than France since the creation of the European Union. 
Despite the high levels of economic convergence and interdependence between 
France and Germany, there remain economic disparities between the two countries. Over 
the past 60 years, Germany has consistently held a higher economic, financial and 
monetary weight in the European Union, maintaining the fact that the two countries are 
the fourth and fifth largest economic powers in the world, and the first two in Europe. 
Economically, Germany has constantly been strong. In 1995, German GDP represented 
approximately one third of combined EU output. Germany has been the key policy 
initiator and agenda-setter for a wide range of issues, including launching the European 
Monetary System in 1979.14 It has also contributed greatly to the institutional architecture 
of the Union, including, but not limited to the strengthening of common macroeconomic, 
social, and environmental policies, as well as introducing concepts such as subsidiarity 
and multitiered governance to encourage the power of government from the bottom-up 
rather than the top-down to produce results that cater to each region’s needs. Germany’s 
power and influence throughout the creation of the EMU was derived through its 
successful use of government diplomacy in addition to its policy credentials, reputation, 
                                                          
14
 Mattli, Walter. The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and beyond. New York: Cambridge UP, 1999. 
Print. 
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actions, as well as the power politics played by private actors, traders in foreign 
exchanges, and its successful investment patterns. Germany’s ability to derive its 
demands successfully through negotiation and cooperation created a very noticeable tilt 
in the balance between Franco-German powers where more German desires were met 
than French ones. 
1.1: The Franco-Germany Relationship through the Creation of the European 
Monetary Union and the Stability and Growth Pact 
The strength of the Franco-German relationship was vital to the foundation of the 
European Monetary Union. Without either of the two countries, the EMU could not have 
been created. Similar to past EU situations regarding Franco-German compromise, the 
outcome of the negotiations resulted in lying closer to German demands rather than those 
of France due to the relative political and economic leverage that Germany held over 
France. At the same time however, it was important that Germany compromise in order 
to acquiesce to its fellow member states, especially France, for example in dropping its 
insistence on fully automatic sanctions.15 The endeavor involved much risk for both 
France and Germany. Germany risked losing the monetary stability they had so carefully 
rebuilt after spiraling inflation in the 1930s, and France risked possible economic 
dominance by the Germans if they were not adamant enough in their requests.16 For 
France, the difficulty lay in the fact that Germany had to be persuaded to relinquish both 
the deutschmark and the Bundesbank’s control over monetary policy to Europe, and this 
                                                          
15
 See Note 9: Heipertz & Verdun 
16
 See Note 1: Maclean & Trouille 
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meant that the EMU would have to be created on Germany’s terms, with substantial 
concessions by France.  
The political will showcased by both countries through the creation of the EMU 
proved the ability of the Franco-German motor to achieve great progress for not only the 
political integration of Europe, but the economic integration of Europe. The drive from 
both countries to succeed gave substantial direction and momentum to the convergence of 
economic interests in EMU policy. From the start of the negotiations, both France and 
Germany were driven by a sense of moral obligation to successfully launch the EMU. 
Convergence around sustainable non-inflationary growth was the key to making the 
EMU agreement possible, and the ECB-centric nature of the euro kept Germany as the 
dominant hand in EMU policy. The ability of France and Germany to work well together 
was more important in the creation of the EMU rather than in its functioning as it was a 
momentous example of cooperation and joint commitment between two unlikely allies to 
show EU member states, as well as the international realm, that the creation of a 
eurozone was not only a possibility, but a reality. 
Although the prior examples may show that Germany held relative power over 
France in the EU, there are other examples to suggest that France certainly exerted 
political influence to counter its power balance with Germany. One of the most distinct 
examples is Germany’s failure to use adequate political power to achieve more of its 
desires through the designing of the Stability and Growth Pact - an agreement between 
the seventeen eurozone members to facilitate and maintain the stability of the EMU: 
consisting of fiscal monitoring by members, the European Commission, the Council of 
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Ministers, and warnings and sanctions against offending members. Germany agreed to 
not have full automaticity in the SGP, which demonstrated a substantial concession.17 
The legal nature of the SGP lay out the loss of bargaining power Germany experienced 
after Maastricht. Throughout this process of decision-making, France was seen as having 
relative bargaining power over Germany, and was therefore able to realize its preferences 
more effectively. Additionally, French policy briefs controlled the political direction and 
monetary policy through the issues of political accountability and legitimacy in the 
SGP.18 
Evidently, France and Germany were the two most important and powerful 
countries in the creation of the SGP. Given its history with the powerful deutschemark 
and notoriously strict Bundesbank, the German government was motivated to create the 
SGP to insure against its increasingly EMU-skeptic populous. Though Germany initiated 
the original idea of the Stability and Growth Pact, the inclusion of France throughout all 
of the major decision-making created a natural two-headed leadership, with France and 
Germany lying on either side of the spectrum. The other member states fell into place 
behind whichever of the two ideologies suited them: be it the monetarily conservative 
and strong Germany, or the harmonization and cooperation-desiring France; and France 
and Germany became their spokespeople.19 Even today, the Commission has great 
difficulty defending the SGP against the national interests of Germany or France. 
Germany was certainly in the position to call for a strict SGP, but similar to its stance in 
the creation of other important EU institutions and programs, it had to be willing to 
                                                          
17
 See Note 9: Heipertz & Verdun 
18
 See Note 1: Maclean & Trouille 
19
 See Note 9: Heipertz & Verdun 
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negotiate a compromise with its ideologically differing fellow member states. The joint 
cooperation of France and Germany throughout the creation of the SGP contributed 
greatly to the strengthening of the conflict-solving capacity of the two countries as a team 
as the bilateral leaders of the European Union. 
1.2: France and Germany in the Monetary Unification Process 
Throughout the process of monetary unification, not only was Germany the most 
powerful country in the European Union, but it relinquished more sovereignty than any 
other state throughout the unification process. This renunciation of sovereignty allowed 
Germany the power to set many of the economic conditions through the creation of the 
EMU, and impose its views on the other member states. These views included setting the 
provisions for the Maastricht criteria, which dictates that a country’s inflation remain less 
than 1.5% below the EU average, their government deficit not exceed 3%, their public 
debt remain below 60%, and their long-term interest rates remain below 2% higher than 
those in the EU’s lowest rates.20 Other member states, including France, felt substantially 
more pressure to “pass the EMU exam” than Germany, which put them in a weaker 
bargaining position in EMU matters. Germany’s position as the unique hegemon of the 
European Union, thanks in much part to its highly acknowledged and prestigious 
Bundesbank, put Germany into place as the anchor of the European Exchange-Rate 
Mechanism (ERM)21, with the deutschemark as the currency the euro would be modeled 
                                                          
20
 "Maastricht Criteria." Euroveeb. 28 Mar. 2011. Web. 
<http://euro.eesti.ee/EU/Prod/Euroveeb/Main_Page/left_menu/The_history_of_the_euro/maastricht.jsp>. 
21
 The European Exchange-Rate Mechanism (ERM) was a system introduced in 1979 to reduce exchange 
rate variability and achieve monetary stability in Europe in preparation for the EMU and the euro. 
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after.22 Due to Germany’s economic success, the Bundesbank was widely accepted as the 
model for the statute of the ECB. Furthermore, because Germany entered the EMU with 
the most powerful economy, the Maastricht criteria were set as a way to attempt to match 
the other European economies to the status of Germany.23 The majority of citizens in 
European member states agreed that the “EMU and the SGP are oriented along the lines 
of the German model.”24 Although Germany was in a position to demand a strict Stability 
& Growth Pact, it had to be willing to negotiate a compromise that would include 
concessions as well in order to please its fellow member states. 
As Germany’s resources have grown in the past two decades, so have their 
diplomatic resources, which have led to Germany’s major influence on the structure of 
the EU. Simon Blumer and William Paterson write that this influence is a “…potential 
source of longer-term empowerment within the EU. The more the FRG secures the 
modeling of EU institutions in its own image, the better it will be placed on the grounds 
of familiarity to use them to its own ends.”25 Blumer and Paterson also write about the 
effectiveness of indirect, or soft power by Germany in influencing the other member 
states in the EU. This was achieved through the member states’ desire to emulate 
Germany in order to reach political success and/or economic growth through adopting 
Germany’s pattern of economic intuitions at the EU level. But is the German growth 
strategy sustainable for other eurozone countries as well as for France? 
                                                          
22
 See Note 1: Maclean & Trouille 
23
 See Note 9: Heipertz & Verdun 
24
 See Note 9: Heipertz & Verdun 
25
 Blumer, Simon, and William E. Paterson. "Germany in the European Union: Gentle Giant or Emergent 
Leader?" Royal Institute of International Affairs 72.1 (1996). 
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The outcome of the EMU negotiations, for reasons of power politics, lay closer to 
German desires over those of France, or of any other member state. Moreover, alterations 
to EMU or SGP conditions depended on the wishes of Germany. If Germany was not 
pleased with a condition, it was likely that the condition would be changed to suit them. 
Although Germany certainly acted as the leading hand through the creation of the EMU, 
their leadership was essentially a way for France, and the other European member states 
to ensure Germany’s participation in the European Union for both political and economic 
advantages.26 In order to appease Germany, France made tremendous efforts to convert to 
the rigorous German model, adopting budgetary discipline and monetary orthodoxy. The 
countless French efforts to invigorate their economy did not evenly match the 
concessions that Germany made through any of the EMU negotiations, offsetting the 
balance of EU leadership.27 
1.3: The Strength of the German Economy 
The economic power balance between France and Germany has never been 
completely equally balanced. A total Franco-German equilibrium would be difficult and 
unrealistic to implement. The true power balance between France and Germany has 
almost always been unequal, especially regarding the fact that the weight of German 
businesses in terms of size, financial power, and turnover is about three times higher than 
the weight of French companies. Germany’s GDP is roughly 24% larger than that of 
                                                          
26
 See Note 1: Maclean & Trouille 
27
 See Note 1: Maclean & Trouille 
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France: $3.31 trillion in 2010 compared to France’s $2.55 trillion.28 In 2010, France 
represented 10.2% of German trade, whilst Germany represented over 19% of France’s 
total trade, showing that trade-wise, France is far more dependent on Germany than 
Germany is upon France. In the past few years, France has in fact increased the trade 
deficit margin between itself and Germany. In 1998, France represented 11% of German 
trade, whilst Germany represented 18% of France’s total trade.29 Additionally, external 
sales of interior goods in the eurozone in the mid 1990s rose in Germany, and decreased 
in France. This growing disparity between the French and German economies have 
French elites constantly worried that they could fall further and further behind Germany, 
overshadowed by the economic and financial weight of the Germans. Moreover, in terms 
of social and infrastructural progress, Germany is currently more focused on deregulation 
and cost cutting than France, which is currently focusing on issues such as regional 
development, infrastructure, and knowledge transfer, which are policies which have 
largely already been implemented in Germany.   
Within the European Union, the German economy is conclusively the strongest. It 
represents 25% of the Community’s GDP, and contributes roughly 25% to the EU’s 
external and internal trade.30 The German economy is also the most productive, and has 
continued this level of productivity throughout the growth of the European Union and the 
monetary union. Economic growth rates for Germany have consistently been above the 
European Union average, and German unemployment rates have remained below the EU 
                                                          
28
 "France." CIA World Factbook. CIA, 6 Apr. 2011. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/fr.html>. "Germany." CIA World Factbook. CIA, 6 Apr. 2011. 
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gm.html>. 
29
 See Note 1: Maclean & Trouille 
30
 See Note 14: Mattli 
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average as well. In analyzing the previous data, can it be said that Germany has taken 
over as the new leader of the EU? Although Germany suffered from inflation and 
economic problems in the early 1990s immediately following German reunification, it 
recovered remarkably well, and rose above all adversity to its current position as the most 
powerful economy in the European Union.31 German unification absorbed political and 
financial shocks, and there remains a strong commitment to multilateral diplomacy and 
European integration within the German agenda, despite the fact that Germany has 
continued to be largest financial contributor to the European Union over the course of the 
growth of the Union. One of Germany’s greatest concerns is that its wealth will be 
exploited by other EU member states in order to support other member states’ weaker 
economies, especially given the recent eastward enlargement, but this will be explored 
further in a later chapter.32 
The shaping of EU institutional arrangement may favor German interests more 
directly than those of other member states, which could give rise to distributional 
concerns, but Germany depends economically on its European partners as much as they 
depend upon Germany. Therefore, any policy that improves stability and security in 
European trade and investment suits Germany as well.33 Moreover, German leadership 
has been largely docile rather than imposing, as it is far more beneficial to build 
concessions to reach a consensus rather than falter in dissent. For this reason, Germany 
stressed the importance of the depoliticisation of monetary policy in order to maintain 
economic stability among all member states. Depoliticisation of monetary policy not only 
                                                          
31
 See Note 25: Blumer & Paterson 
32
 See Note 25: Blumer & Paterson 
33
 See Note 14: Mattli 
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created unobstructed access to the prosperous single European market, but enabled the 
German economy to expand through increased mergers and acquisitions, as well as 
through increased imports and exports. 
To summarize, throughout the course of the growth of the European Union, the 
Franco-German relationship has been at the core of German European policy, where 
integration between the two leaders; firstly Helmut Kohl and Francois Mitterrand, and 
now Nicholas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel has been the center of European cooperation. 
Although collaboration between France and Germany remained the main axis of the EU, 
Germany’s surrender of the deutschemark in favor of the euro, the strongest currency in 
Europe, placed them in a position of de-facto leadership, which has continued into the 
political and economic negotiations of the European Union today.  
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CHAPTER 2: THE DISCOURSE ON THE CURRENT FRANCO-GERMAN 
RELATIONSHIP 
The growth and power balance of Franco-German relations since the start of the 
European Union has continually been a source of great interest to journalists, students of 
European affairs, and policymakers alike. Despite instances of tension and potential 
crisis, France and Germany have maintained a close relationship since 1960. Bilateral 
regularized intergovernamentalism has held the Franco-German relationship together 
sturdily after a history of constant conflict. Both countries have acknowledged the 
importance of their relationship in Europe: Former French President Valery Giscard 
d’Eistaing expressed his view that “Europe cannot move ahead without the Franco-
German engine,”34 President Sarkozy called Franco-German cooperation within NATO 
“a great element of the Franco-German friendship,” and Chancellor Merkel expressed her 
“delight” over further Franco-German cooperation in the future.35  Though Sarkozy has 
been known to under-appreciate and underestimate the Franco-German axis, and 
President Sarkozy and Chancellor Merkel’s relationship has not always been so cordial, 
the two leaders have still managed to agree upon common positions ahead of big EU 
summits. 
In the past few months, however, positive reviews of the Franco-German 
relationship have taken a turn for the south. Articles published since the European debt 
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crisis have called European cooperation “more indecisive and more divided than ever 
before,”36 and the reviews of the Franco-German relationship are no better. The 
Economist calls the Franco-German axis a “myth” and stated in its January article, 
“France loses Ground to Germany,” that “the myth of an equal partnership lends France 
an exaggerated stature and protects Germany from accusations of outright 
unilateralism.”37 The Wall Street Journal claims that France and Germany have reached 
far more instances of disagreement rather than cooperation, stating that France and 
Germany “have clashed recently on bailouts for Greece, the independence of the 
European Central Bank, and what shape a new “economic government for Europe 
proposed by France should take.”38 The European Institute claims that France and 
Germany have “long ago lost that loving feeling” that united them and fueled their 
success in the past. They claim that this has “died out” and Europe can no longer function 
on the same axis as before. The two nations, they claim, have become too dissimilar to 
maintain a “relationship” mainly because of their different economic statures.39 
Though it is true that France and Germany do not always agree, I argue that this is 
nothing new, and has not fundamentally changed the nature or the balance of the Franco-
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German axis. Although France and Germany may disagree upon certain ways that the EU 
is governed, they have made very well on their promise to present a united front, 
especially in the case of the financial fallout, consistently issuing joint statements and 
positions, as was the case with their proposal for the future of economic governance in 
Europe, and in further examples that I present below. 
2.1: Germany’s Lead 
“It is not true that Germany imposes its initiatives. The relationship has changed, but 
only in the sense that it’s no longer a matter of the heart but of interests as well. People 
say that Europe is run by Merkel and Sarkozy but, in this relationship, the woman is 
stronger than the man.”40 - Laurent Wauquiez, French Europe minister 
It is certain that there are differences between France and Germany, and these 
differences are mainly dictated by economic power, but is this economic power 
difference a shift, or simply a difference? As I argue in my paper, Germany has always 
been the economically stronger member state, but this is no new information: it is being 
highly sensationalized by the press as a new development since the European financial 
crisis. 
The Economist states, in fact, that France’s economy recovered more quickly 
from the recent economic recession with a GDP shrinkage of only 2.6% in 2009, over 
Germany’s shrinkage of 4.7% “…sustaining the illusion that everything was fine.”41 This 
was no illusion. France’s economy emerged quickly out of the recession because of a 
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strong, centralized government, quick-acting government economic stimulation, and a 
strong welfare system which maintained domestic demand. The following year, German 
GDP did grow faster than French GDP, but will this remain a pattern? The Economist 
explains this as an effect of “reaping the benefits of years of wage moderation and labor-
market reforms that improved its competitiveness.”42 Germany’s economy certainly 
hasn’t suffered from the economic crisis to the extent that the other EU member states 
have. The weakness of the euro over the past two years has increased the strength of 
Germany relative to its neighbors. In 2010, the Germany economy grew by 3.7%, and 
unemployment continued to fall.  Thomas Petersen, a pollster, claimed that “The average 
German never even noticed the crisis.”43 Moreover, while France attempts to reach a 
budget deficit of 3% in 2013, Germany is attempting to achieve a budget deficit of 0% in 
2014. 
The creation of the euro was ironically aimed to keep Germany in check, and bind 
it more tightly to Europe. This was largely a French led idea to monitor the growth of the 
newly reunited Germany, and when the euro was first introduced, it encouraged the quick 
growth of all the European member states but Germany. It has led instead to a situation 
where Germany has emerged as the state with the strongest version of the euro.44  The 
euro helped to make German economies the most competitive in Europe, without the 
ability of France and Italy to decrease competition by a simple devaluation of their 
currencies, as they had done in the past.  
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2.2: Does France have Reason to Panic? 
One of the other noticeable components of contemporary literature on the Franco-
German relationship following the financial crisis was an overwhelming feeling of panic 
from the French side over their realization of the impending German domination. The 
most common example tended to be the verifiable fact that France is attempting to align 
its tax structure with Germany’s to achieve more fiscal responsibility and stability; 
though this shows less panic than admiration for the strict German tax structure. The 
main argument presented in the existing literature is that France is panicking due to its 
competitiveness with Germany. President Sarkozy was recorded as stating, “I cannot 
accept a deficit in competitiveness with our main economic partner, Germany. I want to 
lay the ground for a relatively homogenous fiscal zone.”45 France will have to work on 
new ways to maintain their political and economic influence in Europe alongside 
Germany. 
The Economist article, “France Loses Ground to Germany,” states that the French 
budget deficit is expected to be over 6% of GDP in 2011, while Germany’s will be under 
3%. They even go so far as to label France “closer to Greece than Germany.”46 In reality, 
France is making large efforts to keep their economy strong through an intense program 
of growth and austerity that Finance Minister Christine Lagarde calls “Rilance” (rigeur et 
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reliance).47 The program aims to combine a policy of a tight budget, with expense cuts, 
tax loophole deductions, and reduced spending with a policy of increased employment, 
increased investment and increased innovation. France is committed to saving €100 
billion over the next three years to reach the Stability and Growth Pact budget deficit 
level of 3% in order to not fall behind Germany.48 What Lagarde has planned for France 
is essentially a plan of debt restructuring where the economy deflates through the use of 
fiscal policy measures in order to eliminate its debts through a slow and painful process 
in order to naturally regain economic growth. 
2.3: Germany and France in the aftermath of the Economic Crisis 
In negotiating post-2013 debt crisis management, The Economist states that “Mrs. 
Merkel got what she asked for, while Mr. Sarkozy has been stuck on the sidelines”49 In 
reality, the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and plans for its successor were 
very much decisions made jointly by the two countries. Wolfgang Schauble, Germany’s 
Finance Minister, and Christine Lagarde sent a joint letter to the European Council 
President, Herman Van Rompuy, suggesting a way to create more EU-wide fiscal 
discipline by “barring an offending member state…from taking part in specific votes.”50 
Christine Lagarde said in an interview supporting the remaining strength of the Franco-
German axis, that, “The political sanction is something that was very much discussed 
between Chancellor Merkel and President Sarkozy, the re-enforcement of financial 
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sanctions is something that Germany has long called for, and the idea of the interest- 
bearing deposit is something that we worked on together,” although she also expresses 
that “Germany has always been very strong on the deficit-cutting, sanctions, discipline 
and control.”51 
Both France and Germany desire a new economic framework for Europe, but the 
two countries have different ideas in mind, which has hindered progress for developing 
such a framework. France would prefer to see the European Council turned into an 
economic government, without the creation of any new institutions, while Germany 
would rather replace the current rescue fund (the EFSF) with a program called the 
European Stability Mechanism.52 Christine Lagarde also admits that there still exist 
disagreements between France and Germany. She says that Germany is very insistent on 
the European Central Bank being independent, but that the French wish for growth and 
jobs to also be incorporated into the ECB agenda.  “On that front,” Lagarde says, “there 
is a stronger German sensitivity than French.”53 Lagarde holds that France cares just as 
much about financial stability as Germany, and is willing to do what it takes to be 
considered as heavily as Germany when it comes to economic decisions for the European 
Union. At the same time, France has pride in its economic structure, and has no desire to 
become Germany’s puppet. Lagarde claims, “Some of the German players probably 
think, well “are the French really serious about it?” Are they going to be really 
disciplined and solid in terms of cutting deficit and having a sustainable debt and will 
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they be prepared to…do what it takes?...we think, well, do we really want to be in the 
straight-jacket that Germany has imposed on its economy up until now?”54 The delicate 
economic power balance between France and Germany has created a state of affairs with 
more concessions from the French side rather than the German side, and the control of 
monetary issues in Germany’s hands. Moreover, France would prefer that the post-crisis 
mechanism be focused on the eurozone alone, while Germany wants all twenty-seven 
member states in the EU involved in policy-making decisions, as Chancellor Merkel 
believes that it is important for all member states to be as fiscally responsible as possible 
in order to create the strongest European Union.55 
The true source of Germany’s current economic power lies in the euro. Because 
the European Central Bank is in Frankfurt, and decisions regarding the euro have 
historically been based on the German model that created the successful deutschemark, 
“Europe is dancing to Germany’s tune,” says Charles Grant, the director of the Centre for 
European Reform, “Germany has the largest and strongest economy, the deepest pockets, 
and the most solid AAA credit rating of any major European economy.”56 This power 
places Germany in the position as the euro’s de-facto capital. In addition to its economic 
differences, disagreements throughout the aftermath of the financial crisis placed 
additional pressure on the Franco-German relationship. Germany was criticized for acting 
too slowly after gaining knowledge of the difficult financial situation Greece, and 
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President Sarkozy was recorded as having said, regarding Germany’s response lag, 
“France is working on it; Germany is thinking about it.”57  
2.4: Germany’s Diverging Interests 
Politique Internationale, and other economic journals are claiming that Europe is 
not as important to Germany as it was in the 1990s.58 Francois Heisbourg, an adviser at 
the Foundation for Strategic Research claims that “everybody in France agrees that 
Germany is becoming an ordinary country, where “the European interest” is no longer the 
default mode.”59 For many German leaders today, the Franco-German relationship and 
the EU have taken more of a backseat to Germany’s policy interests, and are no longer as 
central as they were for the post-1945 generation to set Germany on a new course in 
Europe.60 Wolfgang Schauble, one of the most pro-European figureheads in the 1990s, 
was one of the driving forces behind European integration. Now, reports claim he no 
longer feels the degree of solidarity that he once did with his fellow member states, 
failing to vouch for them in times of difficulty.61 
One of the main reasons Germany agreed to join the European Union after WWII 
was its resulting guilt because of wartime events, and a desire to invest in collective 
European reconstruction. Now, both of these motivating factors are no longer relevant, 
and German economic interest seems to be declining as it becomes more concerned with 
becoming an international power than with helping Europe. Germany has also 
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increasingly become interested in Asian growing markets, as well as Russia, which is 
seen more clearly through their activity in the energy sector.62 Moreover, German 
taxpayers have griped about having to use their taxes to pay off the debts of other 
European member states. Merkel would prefer to demonstrate that German taxpayer 
money that is being used outside of Germany is being used to benefit Germany rather 
than to benefit others. 
The Franco-German motor cannot function without the joint commitment of both 
parties. If France and Germany act together, Europe moves ahead, but if they cannot 
agree, or do not commit fully to the task at hand, Europe stalls. With Germany taking a 
front seat in European issues, and looking outside of Europe to new policy options, the 
Franco-German axis diminishes in both importance and effectiveness. The philosophical 
idea of the European Union asks that Germany commit fully to strengthening Europe 
before looking outwards. “Germany is so preeminently powerful now, economically and 
politically, that it’s changing the EU,” says the Centre for European Reform. “Germany 
has become much more assertive of its own interests.”63 
To summarize, the current discourse places Germany in a newfound power-
holding position in Europe over France. The discourse has emphasized the opposition 
between France and Germany, attempting to show that the two countries have been 
unable to compromise, and have emerged following Germany’s lead. Journals like The 
Economist have claimed that the nations are too dissimilar to maintain the strong 
“relationship” they once held, underlined mostly by their economic differences, which 
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has created an environment where Germany no longer needs France as it once did.64 
Moreover, the discourse has emphasized an unsavory relationship between President 
Sarkozy and Chancellor Merkel, labeling the two as “opposite twins” who suffer from a 
lack of trust.65 
Though the two countries may have economic differences, this does not have to 
underscore the power of their political relationship. As my research has shown, Germany 
has always been the economically stronger of the pair, and the relationship has remained 
strong into the twenty-first century. To some extent, this has had to do with the fact that 
France had more political clout than Germany in the late 20th century due to their seat on 
the United Nations Security Council, their relationship with the United Kingdom and the 
United States, and their reputation in the world post-World War II. In the past few 
decades however, Germany has regained its positive political reputation with its success 
in the European Union both politically and economically, so this gradual shift may alter 
the future of the Franco-German relationship. Despite this change, it still takes French 
agreement to further legislation, meaning that France maintains the ability to act as an 
obstacle within the European Union. 
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CHAPTER 3: DEMONSTRATING GERMANY’S RELATIVE POWER 
THROUGH AN EXAMINATION OF THE EU BUDGET 
Budgets are of enormous importance to the evolution of the European Union both 
politically and economically, though it is very small relative to national budgets – 
representing only about 1% of the EU’s GDP. The European Union budget has 
consistently been a topic of much discussion, in terms of where EU money comes from, 
how it is spent, and the processes by which it is distributed. Since the formation of the 
EU budget, Germany has been the largest net contributor to the EU budget, redistributing 
resources through programs such as the European Regional Development Fund, the 
European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund.66 Its net contribution to the EU budget 
increased from €5.37 billion in 1987 to €11.25 billion in 1992, and in 2007 was €7.42 
billion.67 For recent years, since the conversion to the euro, additional studies have been 
carried out to measure the relative contributions from each member state to the EU 
budget, and the results are interesting. They show that Germany’s contribution, although 
the highest in numerical terms, does not remain so when compared per capita to the 
GDPs of the other member states as well, which makes for compelling debate regarding 
claims that Germany “carries the burden”. This will be explored later in the chapter. 
Politically, the EU budget is important because the money contributed represents 
a commitment of resources to public goods from a member state. Budgetary flows to 
member states are highly visible in that “winners” and “losers” can be easily calculated. 
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The net budgetary balance of a member state is determined by the net cash flow received 
by the member state from the EU budget in that particular year. This includes cash 
inflows from the EU budget to the national budget, cash inflows received by final 
beneficiaries, and all cash outflows from the member state to the budget, based on TOR, 
VAT and GNI68 contributions.69 In 2003, the EU budget was equivalent to 2-4% of the 
combined national budgets of the member states, with its payments representing 1% of 
the Community gross national income. Though the budget may have little 
macroeconomic significance when applied to the European Union as a whole, it is 
extremely important for those member states receiving transfers from the budget’s 
structural funds. 
3.1: Germany and the Net Contributors of the EU Budget 
Paying for unification in the early 1990s had a major influence on German 
citizens’ attitudes to the EU budget, and Germans began to frequently voice their 
opinions about sharing the financial burden of the EU with their fellow member states.70 
The German Chancellor, Gerard Schroeder too, was determined to reduce Germany’s 
high net contributions to the EU budget. Although German reunification significantly 
altered the German economy, with Germany’s per capita income falling from second the 
sixth place amongst EU member states, it remained the biggest paymaster of the EU 
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budget through all of its economic restructuring. In December of 2003, the six largest net 
contributors to the EU budget (Germany, Belgium, Denmark, France, the UK, and the 
Netherlands) expressed their concerns about the overall expenditure of the budget in a 
letter to the President of the European Commission. The letter included provisions 
requesting that the budget expenditure not exceed 1.2% of EU GNI, and that the 
conclusions of the Brussels European Council in October 2002 regarding agricultural 
subsidies until 2013 be respected.71 The proposal sought to strike a balance between 
spending for new member states and the desires of the current net beneficiaries of 
cohesion policy. Current beneficiaries did not want to halt transfers of funds to their 
poorest regions, and threatened to demand compensation if their regions would lose funds 
due to the new transfer programs to newer member states. Net contributor states like 
Germany opposed such compensation, whereas beneficiary states such as Ireland, Spain 
and Portugal insisted on the need to maintain such support until 2014.72  
For France, the permanence of the agricultural agreement from October 2002 was 
one of its top priorities in its negotiations towards the next financial perspective, while 
for the UK, the main concern was to keep the UK rebate intact to the fullest extent 
possible.73 In the case of the United Kingdom, the rebate improved Great Britain’s 
budgetary balance, as well as France’s, which led to a tight balance between the national 
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interests of France and the UK throughout negotiations towards the next financial 
perspective.74 
Moreover, Germany and France, experiencing a low growth rate in 2002 and 
2003, had failed to meet the terms of the Stability and Growth Pact- committing the 
members of the euro to comply with the Maastricht criteria- which further decreased their 
willingness to tolerate increases in the EU budget.75 Given that regional expenditure is 
driven by strong interests, and agricultural expenditure was to be excluded from 
negotiations under the Franco-German agreement of 2002, proposed increases in research 
and development, and innovation and technology were likely to be rejected in order to 
comply with the desires of the net contributors who favored a budget of austerity. 
Overall, the net contributors were very resistant to endowing the Union with any 
significantly larger financial resources. 
3.2: A Statistical Examination of Germany’s and France’s role in the EU Budget 
Looking at the contributions of member states to the EU budget, it is important to 
clarify that individual net budgetary balances are negative in cases where the member 
state contributes more than it receives in return. This number is often listed as NBB (Net 
Budgetary Balance). 
One of the most important aspects of this thesis is analyzing Germany and 
France’s contributions to the EU budget, which I will do in part through the analysis of 
graphs created and published by Terry Wynn, Member of the European Parliament & 
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Chairman of the Committee on Budgets of the European Parliament, in his article, “The 
EU Budget – Public Perception & Fact”, by Mojmir Mrak and Vasja Rant, “EU Consent, 
EU Budget Working Paper: Financial Perspective 2007-2013: Domination of National 
Interests,” and by Helen Wallace in her book, “Policy-Making in the European Union.” 
My research revealed that one of the budget’s most frequently published years 
was 2002, as it was the first year the euro was fully introduced into the eurozone. In the 
attached graphs and charts, Figure 1: “2002 EU Net Contributors and Recipients,” shows 
Germany and the United Kingdom as the highest net contributors to the EU, with Italy 
and the Netherlands coming in 3rd and 4th place respectively, and France at a further 
behind 5th place. Germany led the member states with a net contribution of close to €6 
billion and France only contributed a third of this value: €2 billion. Even if the graph is 
altered to calculate only real net balances, (minus traditional owned resources) 
Germany’s and France’s contributions do not change, nor do their order of contributions. 
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Figure 1: 2002 EU Net contributors and recipients (millions of euros)76 
 
Giving a more general perspective of the breakdown of net contributions to the 
EU Budget in “Figure 2: Net Contributions 1997 to 2006” we see that Germany is clearly 
the largest net contributor throughout all ten years, with a net budgetary balance of €-11 
billion towards the EU budget in 1997, and over €-6 billion in 2006. France on the other 
hand, held a net budgetary balance of close to €-1.7 billion in 1997, and €-3 billion in 
2006. Moreover, the graph shows that the United Kingdom ended the 1990s contributing 
more money to the EU budget than France, but gradually began to contribute less and less 
while France began to contribute more and more. To judge these numbers more clearly in 
a numerical manner, as can be seen in “Figure 3: EU Budget Contributions 1999-2007,” 
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in 1999, Germany had a net budgetary balance of €-8.54 billion, and throughout the 
following 8 years, maintained an average net budgetary balance of €-7.03 billion. France 
on the other hand, contributed net €-15 million in 1999 (more than 500 times less than 
Germany), but swiftly and steadily increased its contribution until it reached a net 
budgetary balance of €-3.01 billion in 2007, now only a little under half of Germany’s 
contribution. 
Figure 2: EU Budget77 
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Figure 3: EU Budget Contributions 1999-200778 
 
One of the most interesting graphs I encountered was Figure 4: “Net Contributors 
and Recipients in 2002” and Figure 5: “Member States’ Contributions in Relation to their 
Population,” which gave a surprising result, showing that in fact, Luxembourg, Denmark, 
and Belgium are the three countries whose citizens pay most per capita towards the EU 
budget, at €460, €318.50 and €295.90 respectively as their yearly contribution per capita. 
Germany and France only paid €210 and €242.3 per capita respectively, with France 
actually carrying a heavier financial burden per capita than Germany towards the EU 
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Budget.79 On the other hand, Portugal, Greece, and Spain have the lowest per capita 
contributions to the EU budget, which is less surprising, as they are typically 
acknowledged as the eurozone’s poorest countries. This data concerning Luxembourg, 
Denmark and Belgium is mostly due to the fact that countries with smaller populations 
are contributing more per capita than countries with larger populations. 
Figure 4: Net Contributions and Recipients in 2002 (in euro per citizen)80 
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Figure 5: Member States’ Contributions in Relation to their Population81 
 
Interestingly enough and best displayed in Figure 1, from 1997 to 2006, Germany 
has gradually decreased its contributions to the European Union, while France has 
gradually increased its own. Despite the reports that Germany has slowly been gaining 
both economic and political traction against France, the opposite seems to be true in 
terms of economic contributions.  
This graph is most interesting as it decreases the previously assumed growing 
economic omnipotence of Germany within the European Union. It shows that Germany is 
not truly “carrying the burden” to the extent that those observing European Union politics 
believed, as Luxembourg, Denmark and Belgium are even more economically involved 
than Germany per capita. Does this mean they should increase their bargaining power 
relative to their economic engagement? Should Luxembourg, Denmark and Belgium 
have the ability to counter economic decisions made by Germany and France because 
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their citizens are paying more per capita into the EU than Germany and France’s citizens 
are? The truth is that overall economic contributions are more important to a member 
state’s political weight than are per capital economic contributions, because their 
presence in political and economic decision-making is simply larger than the presence of 
other rich member states with small populations. This power held by Germany enables it 
to be the leading voice in economic decisions because, although it may be paying a 
similar per-capita contribution to the EU Budget as Austria or Sweden, the sheer number 
of citizens paying that contribution within Germany’s population translates to a higher 
collective bargaining power. 
3.3: Bail-Outs & Financial Redistribution since the Debt Crisis 
As I previously explored in my chapter on the current discourse of the Franco-
German relationship, the recent economic crisis has put additional strain on France and 
Germany, especially Germany, to make decisions about European financial redistribution 
regarding the debt crises of the struggling member states. This new role adopted by 
Germany has not pleased all member states and Germany has been viewed as being 
determined to export its “culture of economic stability” to the entire euro area.82 As stated 
by the European Council of Foreign Relations’ Ulrike Guerot and Mark Leonard, “There 
has been a….’unipolar moment’ within the eurozone: no solution to the crisis was 
possible without Germany, or against Germany.”83 
                                                          
82
 See Note 37: Economist Power Shift 
83
 Wolf, Joerg. "Europe's Indispensable Nation." Atlantic Review - Analysis of Transatlantic Relations and 
U.S. Foreign Policy. 12 Apr. 2011. Web. <http://atlanticreview.org/archives/1468-Europes-Indispensable-
Nation.html>. 
 42 
 
The financial crisis has paved the way for countless meetings and negotiations 
between the leaders of the EU member states in order to solve the crisis. Debt-structuring 
seems to be the most likely scenario that will come into effect, as permanent fiscal 
transfers are highly unpopular among Europe’s richer core, especially Germany. Semi-
permanent fiscal transfers are more popular, in the form of euro bonds, but the richer 
member states are unlikely to accept large budget transfers in order to write-off the debts 
of poorer countries.84 The main issue is that the most financially disciplined member 
states do not want to pay for the mistakes of the most reckless, as they do not feel obliged 
to do so. Therefore economic responses among the leaders of richer member states have 
been slow and often contradictory, creating resentment on both sides.  Chancellor Merkel 
has spoken publicly with frequency on the matter, in an attempt to reassure German 
voters that Germany is not a “transfer union” in which taxpayers’ money is given to the 
“sinners” on the periphery of the eurozone.85  Germany has always been highly involved 
in European integration, and it is finding itself further ostracized by its fellow member 
states due to such austerity. Germany has even been blamed for having some fault in 
causing the crisis by publicly stating that insolvent countries may never be able to pay 
back all of their debts. If Germany, France, and the other wealthier member states are 
able to cooperate more effectively through the ability to represent all eurozone 
economies, and not isolate those in genuine need of help, they may be able to reach a 
popular consensus more quickly. 
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In an attempt to resolve issues surrounding the resolving of the debt crisis, 
Germany and France have put effort into creating an initiative known as the 
“Competitiveness Pact,” or a “grand bargain” where weaker member states agree to 
overhaul their economies through a series of reforms in retirement and retirement ages, 
corporate taxes, and wage indexation in order to remain part of the eurozone.86 
Additionally, France and Germany have put forth a two-step objective in order to rescue 
those economies on the brink of collapse, such as Greece and Ireland, with temporary 
loans, and couple these efforts with increased economic rigueur to prevent future crises.87 
Germany and France have already contributed billions of dollars to bailing out their 
fellow member states: in May 2010, Germany contributed €22.4 billion to the bailout of 
Greece, while France contributed a commendable €16.8 billion to the effort, with the 
German press labeling the bailout, “the fattest check in [German] history.”88 As of April 
7th, 2011, the total resources available for European bailouts totaled €864.8 billion, 
including the €440 billion of the European Financial Stability Facility, (of which the 
lending capacity is €250 billion) and €280 billion from the IMF (as illustrated in Figure 6 
below) Of these funds, €110 billion have gone to Greece, €67.5 billion have gone to 
Ireland, and €80 billion have gone to Portugal. Germany has contributed over €100 
billion to the EFSF, and France has contributed just under €100 billion.89 Germany, 
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France, Italy and Spain alone are contributing 75% of the bailout funds.90 The magnitude 
of such contributions from richer member states enable countries like France and 
Germany to make conclusive decisions regarding the future of European economic 
governance, and to decide to what extent funds can be transferred from richer to poorer 
member states, which is the main reason for such the slow decision-making process 
among the leadership of the EU. 
In summary, Germany has been the largest net contributor to the EU Budget since 
its formation. Germany’s role as “paymaster” has enabled it to be the leading voice in 
economic decisions, but has also made it reluctant to support fiscal transfers, especially in 
light of the European debt crisis, as it does not find itself responsible for the economic 
problems of its fellow member states. Interestingly enough, member states with smaller 
but richer populations, like Denmark, Luxembourg, and Belgium are contributing more 
per capita than Germany or France. In fact, Germany has decreased its contributions to 
the budget whilst France has increased its own. It will be very interesting to see how 
negotiations play out between these power players in solving the debt crisis and creating 
a stronger financial framework for the euro. 
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Figure 6: European Bail-Out Funds91 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on my findings and analysis, I conclude that the current Franco-German 
power balance in the EU has not tipped in favor of Germany. The Franco-German power 
balance has never been truly equal, and is unlikely to reach absolute equality in the 
future. Germany has been the largest source of economic power in the European Union 
since its creation, and has remained the stronger economic and political power throughout 
the Union’s growth. Although Germany’s position in the European Coal and Steel 
Community and the European Economic Community was weak initially following World 
War II, its renunciation of much sovereignty allowed it the power to set many of the 
economic conditions within the European Union. This leadership continued through the 
creation of the EMU as it adopted the euro, leaving behind the strongest currency in 
Europe. 
In regards to the Franco-German relationship, despite the relatively stronger 
German power, the Franco-German relationship has always remained within Germany’s 
most important policy interests. Although the two countries may disagree upon certain 
methods with which the EU is governed, or should be governed in the future, they have 
consistently presented a united front, most notably in light of the financial crisis with 
their joint-proposal for economic governance in Europe. Both Chancellor Merkel and 
President Sarkozy remain committed to their role as partners in European Union 
leadership, and claims that the nations have become too dissimilar to retain their 
relationship are being proven incorrect as we enter the aftermath of the financial crisis. 
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Looking towards the future, it is important that France and Germany continue to 
commit wholeheartedly to reforming the financial framework of the eurozone. This may 
dictate a move closer to a federation and the dreaded “transfer union” status, but this is 
the commitment that the countries have made in joining the monetary union. Time will 
tell whether Europe’s richer countries decide to financially support their weaker member 
states, whether the weaker member states will devalue their way back to reality or 
whether they will endure a harsh period of debt restructuring.  
What will be interesting is to see how Franco-German dynamics play out in the 
future. Will Germany pursue sole leadership of the EU or will it reduce its involvement? 
Will France succeed in its rilance austerity measures and emerge from the decade with an 
economy just as powerful as Germany’s? Either way, France has managed to remain as 
powerful a political voice as Germany, as evidenced by its continuing ability to convince 
Germany to make concessions (eg. Germany’s acceptance of greater coordination of 
economic policy) and it is likely that whatever decision Europe decides to take in 
reforming its monetary union, France and Germany will be at the forefront of 
negotiations. 
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